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Hairston v. State: Capital Punishment for Youthful Offenders
Case Summary
by Brandon Helgeson
Idaho Law Review
The Supreme Court of Idaho recently held in Hairston v. State that evidence of evolving
standards of decency, both nationally and in Idaho, did not support a categorical prohibition on
capital punishment for youthful offenders—those between the ages of eighteen and twenty—
under the Eighth Amendment. 1
The petitioner, James Hairston, had been found guilty of two counts of first degree
murder and one count of robbery in 1996, and he was sentenced to death for the two murders.2
Hairston was nineteen at the time of the murders.3 This case arose out of Hairston’s fourth
post-conviction petition for relief, contending that (1) imposing the death penalty on an
individual who was under the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense is unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment; and (2) the trial court did not give adequate consideration to
mitigating factors applicable to youthful offenders during the sentencing phase.4 The State of
Idaho moved for summary dismissal of the petition under Idaho Code section 19-4906(c),
arguing in part that the petition was time-barred.5 The district court rejected this claim, and the
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed that decision here, allowing the court to evaluate Hairston’s
constitutionality claim on the merits.6
Hairston’s claim regarding the constitutionality of sentencing a youthful offender to death
essentially sought to extend the age cutoff for the prohibition on executing offenders who were
under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense that was announced by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Roper v. Simmons.7 In Roper, the Supreme Court applied its framework for
determining whether a form of punishment can be considered “cruel and unusual” under the
Eighth Amendment by looking to evidence of “the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”8 This standard was applied later in Graham v. Florida9 and
Miller v. Alabama10 to prohibit the most extreme forms of criminal punishment for youthful
offenders under the age of eighteen.
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In order to meet this standard, Hairston proffered evidence of both a national and
Idaho-specific consensus that had developed against the execution of offenders who were under
the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense.11 This included citing to jurisdictions that no
longer executed defendants under the age of twenty-one through abolition of the death penalty
entirely, suspending executions through moratoria, and those who no longer execute youthful
offenders under the age of twenty-one through prosecutorial practice.12 Hairston cited to the fact
that Idaho has not sentenced anyone under the age of twenty-one to death since he was
sentenced.13 The decisions of prosecutors, judges, and juries, he said, reflect a sentiment against
executing offenders in this age group.14 Hairston also offered evidence of a consensus among the
scientific and medical communities that the purposes of the death penalty15 are equally
disfavored for offenders under the age of twenty-one as they are for those under the age of
eighteen due to their relative psychological and neurobiological immaturity.16
The Idaho Supreme Court found these arguments unpersuasive for finding the execution
of an offender between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one unconstitutional for two main
reasons. The first was that Hairston had not cited to any legislative enactment or executive action
prohibiting the execution of nineteen and twenty-year olds.17 The Court reiterated “absent some
legislative or executive action, a determination by this Court that Idaho’s death penalty statute is
unconstitutional based on evolving standards of decency and public opinion is unsupported.”18 In
addition, the Court noted that there is no case since Roper that has meaningful precedential value
that has extended the age cutoff to twenty-one.19
The second—and perhaps most important—reason for rejecting Hairston’s claim is that
the United States Supreme Court has not extended the age limit in the fifteen years since Roper
was decided.20 Because Idaho’s courts have traditionally tracked the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court,21 the Idaho Supreme Court considers the issue
“definitively spoken” on by the U.S. Supreme Court and deferred to their judgement.22 The court
recognized the inherent issue in drawing a categorical line, which was recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Roper: “The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear
when an individual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of
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maturity some adults will never reach. For the reasons we have discussed, however, a line must
be drawn.”23 Thus, despite the evidence of national, international, and statewide trends, and the
medical and scientific evidence provided by Hairston, the Court found that Idaho’s death penalty
statute allowing for the execution of offenders who were over the age of eighteen at the time of
their offense was constitutional.24

23
24

Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
Hairston, 167 Idaho 462, 472 P.3d at 50.

Published by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law, 2021

3

